# Lesson 3.5j
AOE-UN MPKI support to UN MDMP

Content

- MPKI support to UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

- Phase 1 brief

- Mission Analysis

- COA Development, Analysis and Selection

- Production of the OPORD

Learning Outcomes

- Explain how MPKI products such as AOE supports the staff

- Explain why the Phase 1 brief is important

- Explain how MPKI supports the UN MDMP by phase

MPKI support to UN MDMP

Orders Process ⟷ 🇺🇳 ⟷ **Peacekeeping Military Intelligence Support Process**

Constant analysis of the Operating Environment (OE)

Receipt of Mission Brief

- **What do we know already? What does the AOE tell us?** (*own / other & higher level INTEL*)
- **Start Mission-specific AOE**
- What collection assets are available and can we task them?
- What are the initial PIRs/CCIRs/IRs?
- What mapping products are required / available?

Phase 1 IPOE
(constant analysis)

Cmdr. Initial guidance   **WARNO 1**

- Complete Mission-specific PKMI AOE
- Draft (short) Intelligence Estimate
- Draft initial IAP
- **Deliver Phase 1 Brief to Comd and Staff; Distribute Short Intelligence Estimate**
- **Warning Order 1** – Situation

Phase 2 Mission Analysis

Mission Analysis Brief   **WARNO 2**

- PKMI contribution to mission analysis
- Confirmation of PIRs
- **Warning Order 2** – Deliver the 'Situation' paragraph

Phase 3 COA development

COA brief

- PKMI support to planning groups
- Confirm and develop Most Likely and Most Dangerous Actor Courses of Action (ML/MD ACOA)
- Update IAP and OE situation as required
- **Give Support to Commander's own forces COA brief**

Phase 4 COA analysis and selection

Decision Brief for Cmdr.   'Test the plan' & **WARNO 3**

- **Support COA analysis and selection** (relevant threat / influencing actors)
- Update situation and IAP as required;
- Support Commander's decision brief from PKMI perspective
- Consider PKMI actions required during Mission execution
- Provide PKMI contingencies to **'test' the plan**
- **Warning Order 3 (if used)** – Intelligence / situation paragraph

---

Phase 5 Production of the OPORDER

Mission Rehearsal

- PKMI guidance on control measures and de-confliction of acquisition and (other) operational activities (e.g. Recce force or other collection assets may require extraction prior to H-hour)
- **Draft OPORDER** – Situation para, intelligence annex and support to wider staff branch annexes (e.g. ISR, logs, CIMIC, and communications)
- Support to **Mission Rehearsal** – raise scenario's and contingencies to confirm plan and responses

Receipt of Mission Brief

- What do we already know?

- Collection assets and mapping products available

- Initial Commander guidance
  - PIRs/SIRs to initial IAP
  - Mission specific planning begins

- Start mission-specific AOE

Phase One Brief – why is it relevant?

Orders Process	Peacekeeping Military Intelligence Support Process
Receipt of Mission Brief	• **What do we know already? What does the AOE tell us?** (*own / other & higher level INTEL*) • **Start Mission-specific AOE** • What collection assets are available and can we task them? • What are the initial PIRs/CCIRs/IRs? • What mapping products are required / available?
Phase 1 IPOE (*constant analysis*) Cmdr. Initial guidance — **WARNO 1**	• Complete Mission-specific PKMI AOE • Draft (short) Intelligence Estimate • Draft initial IAP • **Deliver Phase 1 Brief to Comd and Staff; Distribute Short Intelligence Estimate** • **Warning Order 1** – Situation environment paragraph
Phase 2 Mission Analysis Mission Analysis Brief — **WARNO 2**	• PKMI contribution to mission analysis • Confirmation of PIRs • **Warning Order 2** – Deliver the 'Situation' paragraph
Phase 3 COA development COA brief	• PKMI support to planning groups • Confirm and develop Most Likely and Most Dangerous Actor Courses of Action (ML/MD ACOA) • Update IAP and OE situation as required • **Give Support to Commander's own forces COA brief**
Phase 4 COA analysis and selection Decision Brief for Cmdr. — 'Test the plan' & **WARNO 3**	• **Support COA analysis and selection** (relevant threat / influencing actors) • Update situation and IAP as required; • Support Commander's decision brief from PKMI perspective • Consider PKMI actions required during Mission execution • Provide PKMI contingencies to 'test' the plan • **Warning Order 3 (if used)** – Intelligence / situation paragraph
Phase 5 Production of the OPORDER	• PKMI guidance on control measures and de-confliction of acquisition and (other) operational activities (e.g. Recce force or other collection assets may require extraction prior to H-hour) • **Draft OPORDER** – Situation para, intelligence annex and support to wider staff branch annexes (e.g. ISR, logs, CIMIC, and communications)
Mission Rehearsal	• Support to **Mission Rehearsal** – raise scenario's and contingencies to confirm plan and responses

Constant analysis of the Operating Environment (OE)

Phase One Brief

- Informs / situates commander and staff prior to planning

- AOE foundation – 'Golden Thread' products:
  - Physical, human, information terrain analysis
  - Actor evaluation
  - Situation integration with assessed ML/MD COAs

Phase One Brief – Template

Serial	Topic
01	Scope. Overview of what the Phase 1 Brief is going to cover and what briefing aids are going to be used.
02	Intelligence foundation. What intelligence the brief has been based on and inform the Commander of any intelligence gaps that are pertinent to the Mission.
03	Key assumptions and outputs. Inform the Commander of the key deductions and judgements you have identified from conducting AOE.
04	Ground in general. The Physical Terrain. Orientate the Commander and Planning Staff to the ground including weather effects.
05	Ground in detail. The Mission Specific Physical Terrain in more detail. Depending on the type of mission to be conducted (Defensive / Offensive), inform the Commander of the specific ground detail that will affect his/her mission including any key infrastructure.
06	Human and Information Terrains. Factors that are pertinent to the mission are likely to include: • Tribal and ethnic laydown • Displaced persons and refugees • NGOs • Key leaders • Pattern of life • HN armed forces • Infrastructure (Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academic, Refuge, Medical, Security, Other) • Information environment – social media trends (supportive/resistant to UN presence), media reporting, local communication capabilities
07	Threat Evaluation. Analysis of all threat actors that are pertinent to the mission, to include: • Threat actor assumptions • Threat actor organisations and hierarchies including Key Leaders • Threat actor TTPs • Threat actor equipment and capabilities • Strengths and Weakness and Centre of Gravity Analysis
08 ★	Situation Integration. How will the threat actors and human factors affect the mission when considered in relation to the physical environment? To include: • Actors' Courses of Actions. Most Likely and Most Dangerous. • Updated Intelligence Acquisition Plan based on known intelligence gaps

Include Vital Intelligence

Physical Terrain Analysis

Human and Information Terrain Analysis

Actor and Threat Actor Evaluation

Situation Integration

Phase One Brief – Summary

- Mission specific

- Not telling the Commander all you know

- No more than 45 minutes

- Focus on situation integration and not the ground

- Know audience

- Keep it simple

- Remember the 'Golden Thread' products

Example of a Phase One Brief

Mission

- UNMMIG deploys in three conflict affected areas (sectors west, east, and north) of GARLAND, for the duration of its mandate to ensure: a safe and SECURE environment for all civilians in its area of operations; to FACILITATE the freedom of movement of humanitarian aid convoys; to MONITOR and report on violations of ceasefires, and of human rights violations; and, where possible, to ASSIST the government in the re-establishment of State authority.

Sector East mission is to establish a TOB south west of BINGA to DISRUPT IK freedom of movement, REASSURE local population and IDPs iot to establish SECURE environment and ASSIST Government of GARLAND.

Scope – Part One

- Vital Intelligence
- Key Assumptions and outputs (if applicable)
- Analysis of the Operating Environment

  Ground in General

  Ground in Detail

- Information Terrain

  GSM/Radio coverage

  Local media – TV and Radio – are they supportive of UN?

  Use of social media

  Local communication systems/meetings.

- Human Terrain Analysis

  Tribal/Ethnic Laydown – if important

  Key actors: NGOs, Key Leaders, Refugees etc.

  Pattern of life – If applicable

  HN Armed Forces

Scope – Part Two

- Actor Evaluation
  Locations/organisations/capabilities/TTPs
    COWARD
    SWOT/COG
- **Situation Integration**
  - **ML / MD COA**
- Event Overlay NAI/ TAI
- Recommended PIRs
  Updates to IAP
  Known intelligence gaps

Analysis - So what?

Vital intelligence

- SIGINT report 2245Z03MAY19_003 suggests increased IK movement of arms and ammunition into caches within BINGA

- HUMINT report 0935Z01MAY19-002 states that IK have conducted public speeches in the IDP camp stating that UN forces are the enemy of GARLAND and should be forced to leave immediately

- HUMINT report 0718Z29APR19_001, which has not been corroborated and is assessed as C3, states that coercion activity of local civilians to join the IK cause has increased

- **Key assumptions based on current intelligence:** It is assessed the any UN activity within the vicinity of BINGA will result in an armed / kinetic IK response

Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE)

Ground in general – Mission specific

ROBOT or OCOKA are helpful but break the terrain down logically

Restricted Terrain

Ground in detail – Mission specific

Ground in detail – Mission specific

Information Terrain

Information Terrain – Mission specific

How do population communicate?
How robust is this network?
How secure is it?
How does it affect our mission?

Human Terrain

Human Terrain – Mission specific

Ethnographics Sector East

Tribal Breakdown

Tutu · Eri · Abu · Sunka · Nimba

Human Terrain – Mission specific

Where could the actor get its support?
Which areas are permissive to UN?

Human Terrain – Mission specific

Any complexities that could affect our mission?
Movement through the town e.g. pattern of life activity?
Situation within IDP camp?
HN Security Force laydown?

Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
Weather type	☀	⛅	☁	🌧	🌧
Max Temp °C / °F	27°C / 81°F	24°C / 75°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F
Min Temp °C / °F	17°C / 63°F	16°C / 61°F	12°C / 54°F	11°C / 52°F	11°C / 52°F
Clouds	Clear	Scattered	Broken	Overcast - Rain	Overcast - Rain
Precipitation	0 – 15 mm	0 – 15 mm	0 – 15 mm	225 – 290 mm	250 – 300 mm
Humidity	25 %	25 %	60 %	75 %	75 %
Wind direction	SW ↗	SW ↗	SE ↖	E ←	E ←
Sunrise and set	06.07 / 18.58 hour LT	06.08 / 18.59 hour LT	06.09 / 19.00 hour LT	06.10 / 19.01 hour LT	06.11 / 19.02 hour LT
Moonrise and set	20.26 / 07.47 hour LT	21.04 / 08.33 hour LT	21.37 / 09.19 hour LT	22.17 / 10.04 hour LT	22.57 / 10.51 hour LT
Illumination % night	Illumination 88.5 %	Illumination 81.6 %	Illumination 73.4 %	Illumination 64.1 %	Illumination 53.9 %

Weather effects matrix

Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
UN Personnel				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
UN Material				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
Rotary wing & MV				Visibility	visibility
Fixed wing - transport				Visibility and wind	visibility
UAV				Visibility & wind	Visibility & rain
Movements (roads)				Flooding risk	Flooding risk
Movements (off-road)					Condition & Flooding
Communications				Distance reduction	Distance reduction
Specific effects on UN Operating Environment		NSTR	NSTR	DPRE / Flooding	DPRE / Flooding risk NCAG / TERR IED

| Legend:	Non-assessable / NSTR	Favorable	Marginal	Unfavorable

How does it affect the mission?
# What pertinent detail is included here?

Actor Evaluation – Mission specific

- **Known locations? Are they assessed locations?**
- **Known numbers?**
- **How old is the data that forms the basis of that assessment?**

Actor Evaluation – IK

- **What is the important data? Who is important and why?**
- **How does the leader maintain control and deliver orders?**
- **Has this organisation changed due to the success of UN missions?**

IK – COWARD – Key Takeaways

Capability	Organisation	Weapons + Equipment	Asymmetric TTPs	Reinforcement / Logistics	Dispositions / Doctrine
Little is known about its key leaders, but the 'Nimr' (NFDK) is known to be the overall military leader.	Katibats – operating in respective clan areas	Small Arms – AK variants. Sophisticated Sniper capability SIEDs	Hit and run ambush attacks against host nation security forces	Each Katibat has a religious and military leader.	Standard insurgent / guerrilla TTPs.
religious leaders to deliver propagandistic sermons targeting its enemies Limited campaign given size of grouping No evidence of capability to conduct a spectacular	IK has a decentralized leadership model, with key leaders – of which little in known - based in Abusir; Katibats don't operate as a single entity – each comprises sub-groups. Excellent COMSEC	use females in SPBIEDs SVBIEDs	IK not capable of large-scale conventional operations against UNMIGAR or the GAF. IK asymmetric attack capabilities have increased as a result of the recent influx of combat-hardened Jihadist fighters from the 6th	Support from population who believe in their ideology. the group utilizes caches of weapons, hidden on both sides of the border, enabling personnel to evade detection at GAF checkpoints	Unlikely to surrender

Key Takeaway
RPG-7 could be used in SA role (800m range). Threat to UN aviation and light-armour.

300M   500M 700M   1300M

4000M

IK – SWOT – Mission specific

Strengths

- COMSEC
- Local knowledge
- Decentralized Leadership
- Reputation and propaganda

Weakness

- Requirement for religious justification
- Physical Terrain
- Local support not guaranteed
- Composition
- Capability

Opportunities

- Weak Host Nation Security Forces
- Expanding Links with the AWF
- Lack of formal economic opportunities
- Structural causes of the conflict

Threats

- Deployment of UNIGAR
- Coalition between regional partners
- International CT operations

Centre of Gravity: Support of the population

Situation Integration

MLCOA

IK will conduct harassment ATTACKs and widespread DISRUPTion activity in order to ISOLATE UN forces.

Intent/Purpose. DISRUPT UN activity without becoming decisively engaged. UNDERMINE UN presence within the Sector.

MSN. Conduct small arms ATTACK on UN bases IOT REINFORCE their IO campaign.

Endstate. UN being forced to increase security at its bases makes UN a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

Scheme of Manoeuvre:

Shaping:

- Hate speeches. UN as the target.
- Small teams will forward mount to urban areas to prepare.
- Surveillance of UN base and UN force movements.

Decisive:

- Once recce screen is in place, the attack teams will move forward to conduct attack.
- Use of VHF radios to control the attacks. Assessed firing point will be from southern edge of urban area.
- Attack will last NMT 5-10 minutes as per previous attacks. Wpns will be dropped or taken to local caches.

Sustaining:

- Teams will withdraw before decisively engaged using terrain to cover movement.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UN credibility.

I & W:
- Increase in anti-UN propaganda.
- Increased surveillance of UN TOBs;
- Testing of UN security procedures involving unarmed personnel by day and night;
- Significant change to pattern of life in and around UN bases;

IHI:
- Weapons caches;
- Sniper rifles

Weaknesses
- VHF radios can be intercepted.

Strengths
- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

Tactical Functions:

1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – Sniper rifles (U/K variant) and AK47 variants.
4. Manoeuvre – Urban – use of motorbikes, light role.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Use of population and hides to secure lethal aid.

IK will conduct a complex ATTACK using SIEDs in order to NEUTRALISE UN forces.

Intent/Purpose.
NEUTRALISE UN forces in the Sector to undermine UN presence in GARLAND.

MSN. Conduct a complex ATTACK on UN base IOT SECURE FOM and undermine UN forces.

Endstate. UN being forced to withdraw from sector. UN ability to provide security undermined. IK secures total control of sector.

Scheme of Manoeuvre:

Shaping:

- Coercion of vulnerable IDPs.
- Facilitation of SIED and influx of IED expertise into the AO.
- Staging into urban area prior to conduct of attack.

Decisive:

- Use of SIEDs to breach UN TOB perimeter. Followed by ground attack in force.
- Use of VHF radios to control the attacks and as back-up should SIED not be victim operated.

Sustaining:

- Securing of TOB before withdrawal in order to maintain critical capability.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UN credibility.
- Replenishment of IED components.

I & W:
- Increased coercion activity within IDP camps.
- Increase in facilitation of IED components;
- Staging of IED facilitators/SMEs into the AO.

IHI:
- IED SMEs

Weaknesses
- VHF radios can be intercepted.

Strengths
- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

Tactical Functions:

1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – IED vests, AK47 variants.
4. Manoeuvre – On foot. Use of population and urban areas.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Reserves in depth.

Event Overlay – Decision Support

- Explain to Commander the pertinent NAIs and TAIs – what are they identifying or trying to affect? Which COA?
- NAIs / TAIs to be recorded in IAP
- Must have detailed description

Priority Intelligence Requirements

- Where are the IK bed down locations within urban areas?

- What support do they have from the local population / delegation / security forces?

- What vulnerabilities does IK's C2 have to intercept?

- Critical Intelligence Gap

- What is the level of IK influence within the IDP camp?

- What is IK's IED capability?

Verbal Briefs – Tips

- Remove distractions
- Follow formats, avoid scripts
- Determine time to brief- stick to it
- Identify and arrange aids
- Pertinent information only
- Briefer- experience more important than rank
- Eye contact
- Rehearse – this is vital

Mission Analysis

- MPKI contribution to mission analysis

- PIR confirmation

- Warning Order 2 – Situation paragraph – if change / update from Warning Order 1.

COA Development

- MPKI supports planning team

- Confirm Actor's COAs
  - Most Likely
  - Most Dangerous

- Update IAP and OE situation

- Supports own forces COA brief

- Inputs from Phase One Brief / continuous AOE

COA Analysis and Selection

- Supports COA analysis and selection (relevant threat/actors)

- Consider MPKI actions required during mission execution

- Provide MPKI contingencies to "test" the plan

- Draft situation paragraph for WARNO 3

Production of the OPORD

Receipt of Mission Brief

Phase **1** IPOE
(constant analysis)

Cmdr. Initial guidance   WARNO 1

Phase **2**
Mission Analysis

Mission Analysis Brief   WARNO 2

Phase **3**
COA development

COA brief

Phase **4**
COA analysis and selection

Decision Brief for Cmdr.   'Test the plan'
& **WARNO 3**

Phase **5**
Production of the **OPORDER**

Mission Rehearsal

- MPKI guidance on control measures

- De-confliction of acquisition and operational activities

- Draft situation paragraph, peacekeeping-intelligence annex

- Supports staff branch annexes

- Supports Mission Rehearsal – raise scenarios and contingencies (Red-teaming / war-gaming)

Takeaway

- PKI support for the MDMP provides inputs to be integrated during all phases of the planning process

- The Phase One brief is the MPKI cell's moment to situate and inform the Command and Staff prior to the conduct of planning

- An updated peacekeeping-intelligence picture and 'testing' of the potential COAs will inform planning and shape the COA Brief

- The role of the MPKI staff during mission rehearsal is to raise realistic and relevant scenarios involving the physical, information and human terrains to test the plan and ensure that it is viable in relation to possible contingencies

Questions?